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I. INTRODUCTION
Bill Clinton appears to be setting himself up for a tax problem. Some
may ask, "How is he going to get out of this one?"' The President and Hillary
I The President's legacy of various, and often self-inflicted, turmoil has been chronicled
extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., infra, note 164. See also Eric Lichtblau, Clinton Strikes In-
dictment Deal; Case Is Dropped as President Admits to False Testimony; Politics: Agreement
in Lewinsky Sex Scandal Ends all of the Legal Fallout From Impeachment. He Will Lose Ar-
kansas Law License for Five Years and Pay a $25,000 Fine, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at Al
(regarding the last-day plea bargain); Deborah Zobar-Enko, Clinton's Cloud of Scandal,
REUTERS, Jan. 19, 2001 (regarding Whitewater, Travelgate, Vince Foster, Filegate, Web Hub-
bell, and Monica). According to papers filed in the Arkansas Supreme Court investigation,
Clinton's last-minute deal to avoid indictment was to pay $25,000 in costs to the Arkansas
Supreme Court's Committee on Professional Conduct, agree to a five-year suspension of his
law license, agree not to seek legal fees from the federal government regarding the Monica
Lewinsky investigation, and admit that he "knowingly gave evasive and misleading answers" in
a deposition. Clinton himself finally stated, "certain of my responses to questions about Ms.
Lewinsky were false." Lichtblau, supra, at Al. And the fun never stops. Although Clinton
agreed not to seek reimbursement for Monica-related fees, he might for others, including legal
expenses of the impeachment. See Robert L. Jackson, Legal Fund for Clintons Falls Short in
[Vol. 104
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Rodham Clinton set up not one but two trusts to pay their diverse and mounting
legal expenses. The second trust they set up, the Clinton Legal Expense Trust,
formed in 1998, raised $7.3 million and paid out all but $500,000 in legal ex-
penses by February 2000.2 However, the Clintons' tax returns for 1998 and
1999 have not reported income from the legal defense trust when it paid their
legal bills, nor deducted those legal expenses.
3
Final Accounting, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at A27. Subsequently, the United States Su-
preme Court suspended Clinton from practicing before the Court. See Mark Helm, Clinton Law
Privileges Eroded More; Supreme Court Suspends His License to Argue Before Justices,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 2, 2001, at A3.
2 See Lee A. Sheppard, A Look at the Clinton and Gore Tax Returns, 87 TAX NOTES 472,
473 (2000) (citing the ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 2000, at Al). See also
Penchina Web Design LLC, Clinton Legal Expense Trust, at http://www.clintontrust.com (last
updated Aug. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Clinton Legal Defense Trust website]. The First Presiden-
tial Legal Expense Trust Indenture was set up in June, 1994. See Kathleen Clark, Paying the
Price for Heightened Ethics Scrutiny: Legal Defense Funds and Other Ways That Government
Officials Pay Their Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 65, 114 (1997). The original Clinton trust,
because it was set up by the Clintons themselves, could not solicit donations. See id. at 150.
That trust eventually returned all of the over $600,000 of donations. See id. at 119 n.276. See
also Charles Lewis, Clinton Legal Defense Fund Mercenary Politics: Even Nixon Paid Bulk of
His Bills Himself, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 4, 1999, at A15. On March 14, 2001, in
its sixth semi-annual report, the second trust announced it had collected $8.7 million and paid
$7.4 million of Bill and Hillary Clinton's $11.3 million expenses. See Clinton Legal Defense
Trust website, supra.
3 See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 473. The legal expenses of Hillary Clinton, as well as Bill
Clinton, will be discussed in this Article. At least some of Hillary's legal expenses have been
paid by the trust, but it is not clear which investigations gave rise to which expenses. See Jack-
son, supra note 1, at A27 and Clinton Legal Defense Trust website, supra note 2. "Whitewa-
ter" initially involved an investment in Arkansas by both Hillary and Bill, and presumably
could generate deductible legal expenses. Fellow attorney Web Hubbel's investigation in-
volved Hillary's employment at the Rose Law Firm and, thus, also potentially deductible legal
expenses. Travelgate and Filegate involved Hillary's alleged machinations as first lady, not an
employee position, and, therefore, it seems, legal fees paid on behalf of Hillary are not deducti-
ble legal expenses. Vince Foster's suicide, itself a murky matter, is similarly unclear regarding
deductible expenses. But, if Foster were working on the Rose Law Firm records or the White-
water investment at the time of his death, presumably expenses regarding the subsequent inves-
tigation could yield deductions. For more information regarding the various scandals giving
rise to Hillary's legal expenses, see, e.g., Francis X. Clines, The First Lady Under Oath; Hil-
lary Clinton Answers Grand Jury's Questions About Law Firm's Billing Records and "Other
Matters," THE AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 27, 1996, at Al; Steve Barnes, A Draft
Indictment Named First Lady; Jury Never Got Starr Aide's Document, THE AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Mar. 19, 1999, at A3. "Hillary Clinton was named in an indictment drafted by a
top aide to Kenneth Starr, the independent counsel, but the document was never presented to a
grand jury .... Robert L. Jackson, Travelgate Inquiry Suggests Signs of Lies by First Lady;
Politics: Independent Counsel Says He Will Not Seek to Indict Her, But Memos Indicate Hil-
lary Clinton Had a Role in Firings, L.A. TIMES. June 23. 2000, at Al. Jackson also wrote
about a prototypical exchange of comments between the independent counsel and the Clinton
administration:
There is "substantial evidence" that the First Lady Hillary Rodham Clin-
ton lied under oath ... But [independent counsel Robert W.] Ray... said
2001]
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This Article will discuss the various legal issues raised by the Clintons'
current situation with the second legal defense fund. The second part of the
Article will discuss whether the Clintons have income from the payment of their
legal expenses by the legal defense trust. The third part of the Article will dis-
cuss whether the Clintons, if they have includible income, can deduct the legal
expenses paid by the trust. Then, the Article will turn to a discussion of whether
the Clintons have an alternative minimum tax problem because the legal ex-
penses are not deductible for AMT purposes. Finally, the Article will conclude
with a discussion of whether a tax penalty should apply against the Clintons for
substantial understatement and against their tax preparer for preparing the tax
returns.
II. INCOME FROM PAYMENT OF EXPENSES BY ANOTHER
A. Introduction
It has long been established, since the Supreme Court's opinion in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,4 that payments of the taxpayer's expenses
by another are income to the taxpayer.5 In a series of revenue rulings, the IRS
has similarly ruled that payments of a public official's expenses are income.6 In
these rulings the IRS refused to accept the argument that these payments were
merely gifts to the public official.7 In doing so, the IRS necessarily dealt with
whether the contributor had a sufficiently disinterested motive to support gift
treatment under Commissioner v. Duberstein.8 Therefore, the discussion of Old
Colony Trust, Duberstein and subsequent cases are key to the following discus-
sion of whether the legal defense funds are income.
The Clintons' first legal defense trust fund, the Presidential Legal Ex-
pense Trust, was set up in June 1994 by the Clintons themselves. 9 However,
he will not seek to indict Mrs. Clinton because he cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that any of her testimony was false . .. The White
House declares the report a vindication of the first lady . . .There is no
evidence the first lady did anything wrong," said spokesman Joe Lock-
hart.
Jackson, supra note 1, at A27.
4 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
5 See id. at 731.
6 See Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31; Rev Rul. 75-146, 1975-1 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 76-
276, 1976-2 C.B. 14.
7 See Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31; Rev Rul. 75-146, 1975-1 C.B. 23; Rev. Rul. 76-276,
1976-2 C.B. 14.
8 363 U.S. 278 (1960). In Duberstein, the Supreme Court stated that "[a] gift in the
statutory sense.., proceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity."' Id. at 285.
9 See Clark, supra note 2, at 114 and accompanying text; Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis:
[Vol. 104
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this trust could not solicit contributions because of federal regulations restricting
gifts to the executive branch, 10 did not accept donations of $1,000 per year for
political reasons," and "suffered from the taint of questionable foreign contribu-
tions before organizers voluntarily abandoned it.' 12 This trust was terminated in
December 1997. Shortly thereafter, in February 1998, the second legal defense
trust fund, the Clinton Legal Expense Trust, was established. 13 The second
trust, which was set up with former Arkansas Senator David Pryor as grantor,
can solicit contributions and accept gifts up to $10,000 per donor per year, ex-
cept from lobbyists, political action committees, and government employees.
14
The Office of Government Ethics, through its general counsel, has said that
when a legal defense fund is set up by a third party, there are no limits on the
size of contributions or how the money is solicited. 5 Therefore, because a third
party set up the second legal defense fund, it avoided two of the three problems
associated with the first trust and allowed the second trust to be much more suc-
cessful in raising legal defense funds.
16
B. General Rules of Income Recognition
1. Old Colony Trust Co. and Pisani
As introduced above, it is well established that a taxpayer has income
when another pays the taxpayer's expenses. 17 In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, the United States Supreme Court held that officers of a corporation
The Tax Treatment of the Clintons' Legal Defense Fund, 64 TAx NOTES 12, 12-13 (1994).
10 See Clark, supra note 2, at 147 and accompanying text (citing 5 C.F.R. § 2635.201-.304
(1996)).
11 See id. at 114-16.
12 Jackson, supra note 1, at A27. See also Lewis, supra note 2, at A15. The first trust was
shut down in December 1997 after it was reported that Yah Lin Trie, an Arkansas restaurateur,
showed up in the defense fund's Washington offices trying to donate $460,000 in sequentially
numbered money orders. Later he was indicted for campaign finance abuses. See Lewis, supra
note 2, at A15.
13 See Robert L. Jackson, Clinton Bills Top Legal Fund by $4 Million Defense: Trustees Say
That Despite $6.3 Million in Private Giving, the President and his Wife Owe So Much That
Solicitations Will Continue Indefinitely, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A22.
14 See Lee A. Sheppard, Clinton Legal Defense Fund II: What Was the Bill from the Tax
Lawyers?, 78 TAx NOTES 1226, 1226 (1998).
15 See Clark, supra note 2, at 148 (citing Ann Devroy & Ruth Marcus, Clinton Aides Setting
Up Defense Funds to Pay Lawyers' Bills, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1996, at A21).
16 Although there are no limits on the size of contributions according to the Office of
Government Ethics, the second trust only accepts gifts up to $10,000. This limit is probably to
ensure that all donations qualify for the gift tax exclusion.
17 See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
20011
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had additional income when the corporation paid, in addition to their salaries,
the income taxes due on their salaries directly to the federal government.18 The
Court reasoned:
The payment of tax by the employers was in consideration of
services rendered by the employee and was a gain derived by
the employee from his labor .... The discharge by a third per-
son of an obligation to him is equivalent to receipt by the person
taxed. 19
The Court rejected the argument that the payments, approved by the Board of
Directors above and beyond salaries, were gifts. 20 According to the Court, "The
payment for services, even though entirely voluntary, was nevertheless compen-
sation within the statute.,,2' At first glance, this landmark decision appears quite
applicable to Bill and Hillary Clinton.
The two main issues from Old Colony Trust Co. that arise in later cases
and rulings and also the Clintons' situation are: (1) whether the payments are for
services; or (2) whether the payments are a gift. These two issues are, of course,
often intertwined. The question of whether a donor to a political figure has
made a gift is one of fact. In a relatively recent case, the Second Circuit, in
United States v. Pisani,22 attempted to explain the Old Colony Trust Co. rule and
reconcile prior rulings of the IRS.23 In Pisani, the only question before the court
with relevance to this inquiry was whether the funds, which were contributed to
the taxpayer's political campaign and diverted to personal use, were income per
se or whether the determination of income was a question of fact.24 The court
held the matter was a question of fact. More specifically, the court quoted the
two-part test of Revenue Procedure 68-19:26 "If it can be shown that the funds
were intended for the unrestricted personal use of the political candidate, then
the service will apply the principles set forth in Commissioner v. [] Duber-
18 See id. at 729-30.
19 Id. at 729.
20 See id. at 730.
21 Id.
22 773 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1985).
23 See id. at 406-07.
24 See id. at 406. According to the Supreme Court, the determination of whether a gift has
been made "must be based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experi-
ence with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case." Duber-
stein, 363 U.S. at 283.
25 See Pisani, 773 F.2d at 406.
26 1968-1 C.B. 810.
[Vol. 104
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stein. 27 Therefore, to establish that a political contribution was a gift, the donee
must meet a two-part test: (1) the donor must have intended the funds for unre-
stricted personal use by the donee political candidate; and (2) the donor must
have had a "detached and disinterested generosity" motive per Commissioner v.
Duberstein.8
The trial court judge in Pisani apparently relied on Revenue Ruling 54-
80,29 which held that political contributions diverted to personal use were tax-
able income as a matter of law. 30 The appellate court, however, followed Reve-
nue Procedure 68-19, which modified the IRS's position and ruled that the mat-
ter was a question of fact.31 The Pisani court also analyzed and distinguished
Stratton v. Commissioner.32 The Tax Court in Stratton held that "the line be-
tween an outright gift and a campaign contribution is a very thin line. 33 The
court held that funds received by Stratton, a former governor of Illinois, were
nontaxable gifts because of the unequivocal testimony of several individuals
who said "they 'intended' to make outright gifts to [Stratton] to do with as he
pleased with no strings attached. 34 This is, of course, the first part of the two-
part Pisani test; the Stratton court also went on to apply what is essentially the
second part of the Pisani analysis. The Stratton court held these transfers met
Duberstein because they were made "from a 'detached and disinterested gener-
osity; out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses."' 35
2. Duberstein and IRS Rulings (on Transfers to Politicians)
In Duberstein, the taxpayer provided sales leads to a business associate
and received a new Cadillac.36 Both the taxpayer and the associate testified that
the leads were the justification for thC new car. 37 Justice Brennan set forth the
test for a gift, i.e., the donor's "detached and disinterested generosity.
38
27 Pisani, 773 F.2d at 406.
28 See id.
29 1954-1 C.B. 11.
30 See Pisani, 773 F.2d at 406 (citing Rev. Rul. 54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11, 12).
31 See id. (citing Rev. Rul. 54-80, 1954-1 C.B. 11 and Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 C.B. 810).
32 54 T.C. 255 (1970).
33 Id. at 280.
34 Id. at 281.
35 Id.
36 See Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 280 (1960).
37 See id. at 280-81.
38 Id. at 285. The Court did not find the "detached and disinterested generosity" necessary
to prove a gift in the facts of Duberstein. See id. Instead, the Court found that despite the fact
that the donor was in no way obligated to give the Cadillac, "it was at bottom a recompense for
20011
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In a series of rulings the IRS has applied Duberstein to transfers to poli-
ticians to determine whether income was present. In Revenue Ruling 60-14,
the IRS ruled there was a lack of donative intent by the members of an organiza-
tion who contributed funds to a committee to pay legal expenses of the taxpayer,
an official of the organization.40 The taxpayer was an elected official of the
organization, which was apparently a labor or similar group, but not a govern-
ment organization.4 1 The Ruling was promulgated the same year as Duberstein
but does not cite the case. The Ruling does, however, rely on similar reasoning
by emphasizing the members' purpose of the payments and the "professed aim"
of the fund-raising committee, which was "to aid the organization in general
through defense of one of its officials. 42 Therefore, the payments by the com-
mittee were not gifts to the taxpayer, but rather constituted gross income to
him.
43
In Revenue Ruling 73-35644 and two later discussed rulings, the IRS
cited Duberstein and again found lack of donative intent.4a In the Ruling, two
congressmen accepted monies to defray costs of newsletters, the first by solicit-
ing subscription fees solely to defray those costs and the second by soliciting
contributions to a segregated bank account.46 The IRS reasoned, "[W]hen a
payment is made by a customer to a taxpayer who provides services to insure
continuation of those services, that payment is not a gift."
47
Revenue Ruling 73-356 is important for two other decisions contained
therein. First, the Ruling stated that performing the functions of a public office
is a trade or business per Internal Revenue Code 8 § 7701(a)(26). n9 Second, the
IRS stated that an elected official, such as a congressman, can deduct these ex-
penses, but they are employee business expenses deducted "below the line,
' 50
otherwise referred to as itemized deductions or expenses deducted "from
Duberstein's past services, or an inducement for him to be of further service in the future." Id.
39 1960-1 C.B. 16.
40 See id.
41 See id. at 17.
42 Id. at 18.
43 See id.
44 1973-2 C.B. 31.
45 See id. at 32.
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 Hereinafter "I.R.C."
49 See Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31, 32.
50 See id. at 33 (stating that "expenses attributable to the performance of a trade or business as
an employee are deductible only in computing taxable income").
[Vol. 104
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In Revenue Ruling 75-146,52 the IRS ruled that funds solicited by a U.S.
congressman for education and training of interns were not gifts, and therefore
were income to the congressman.53 The Service cited Duberstein and held that
the donors did not have a "detached and disinterested generosity" motive, but
rather sought a "more efficient public servant. 54
Finally, in Revenue Ruling 76-276,55 the Service ruled that contribu-
tions of funds to a trust, which was set up to pay a congressman and his staff's
travel expenses, were income and not gifts. 56 Again the Service cited Duber-
stein and reasoned that donative intent was lacking because the contributors
wanted to "enable the Member of Congress to become more accessible to con-
stituents, which, in turn, provides constituents with the opportunity of obtaining
more effective representation in Congress. 57 Also important in the Service's
ruling was the statement that contributions to the trust affected the income of the
Congressman because he could control the trust by controlling the travel.58
C. The Clintons, Nixon, and the Teamsters
1. The Clintons
Based on the above rulings and the Pisani case, it appears likely that the
Clintons will have income from contributions to their legal defense trust. In all
four rulings, the IRS found a lack of donative intent, the "detached and disinter-
ested generosity" required by Duberstein.59 Additionally, the IRS found that the
contributors made the contributions with another intent in mind.
60
Forinstance, in Revenue Ruig 60-14 6t he IRS held that the donors
wanted to aid their organization with the professed purpose of the fund-raising
51 See id. Such below-the-line employee business expenses, although deductible for regular
income tax, are not deductible for alternative minimum tax (AMT) purposes, as discussed be-
low, often resulting in a large AMT liability. See infra notes 204-49 and accompanying text.
52 1975-1 C.B. 23.
53 See id. at 23.
Id.
55 1976-2 C.B. 15.
56 See id. at 15.
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 39-58 and accompanying text.
61 1960-1 C.B. 16.
2001]
9
Dorocak: The Clintons' Legal Defense Fund: Income from Payment of Legal Ex
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2001
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
committee to counteract unfavorable publicity.62 In Revenue Rulings 73-356,
75-146, and 76-276 the IRS found that contributors were seeking a more effi-
cient public servant by contributing to or subscribing to a newsletter,63 contrib-
uting to a fund to educate and train congressional intems, 64 and contributing to a
fund for travel expenses.65
This discussion has focused mainly on the second part of the Pisani
analysis, i.e., whether the contributions were gifts under Duberstein. If, how-
ever, taxpayers such as the Clintons do not first adduce evidence of donative
intent for "unrestricted personal use,"66 then, presumably, the Duberstein analy-
sis would never be needed. Yet, self-serving evidence of donor intent may be
relatively easy to produce in order to meet the "unrestricted personal use" test.67
In addition, the imposition of a trust between the donor and the benefi-
ciary of the donations does not change the fact that there is income to the tax-
payer according to Revenue Ruling 76-276.68 Rather, "the questions of control
by, and inurement to the benefit of, the taxpayer, are of prime importance.,
69
Furthermore, the IRS reasoned, "the taxpayer can control the distribution of
trust funds by determining the extent to which the taxpayer or members of the
taxpayer's staff will travel in connection with the discharge of the taxpayer's
congressional duties and responsibilities."7 °
The Clintons may argue that their trustee, rather than themselves, con-
trolled distribution of the funds. However, under the reasoning of Revenue Rul-
ing 76-276, the Clintons controlled the distribution of the funds by determining
the extent to which they would be more or less likely to incur attorney's fees.7'
62 See id. at 17.
63 See Rev. Rul. 73-356, 1973-2 C.B. 31, 33.
64 See Rev. Rul. 75-146, 197 1-1 C.B. 23, 23.
65 See Rev. Rul. 76-276, 1976-2 C.B. 14, 14.
66 United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1985).
67 See Stratton v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 255, 281 (1970) (stating that "[sleveral ... witnesses ...
testified unequivocally that they intended to make outright gifts ...." (emphasis added)). How-
ever, even though self-serving evidence may be used to satisfy the unrestricted personal use test,
such evidence may not be used to satisfy the Duberstein test. See Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363
U.S. 278, 286 (1960).
68 See Rev. Rul. 76-276, 1976-2 C.B. 15, 15 (quoting Mount Vernon Gardens, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 298 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1962) ("[T]he creation of a trust... is not in and of itself suf-
ficient to prevent the trust money from being treated as income.")).
69 Id. at 15 (quoting Mount Vernon Gardens, Inc. v. Comm'r, 298 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1962)).
70 Id.
71 The fact that the President may lack willpower to control certain urges and then decides to
hire attorneys would not appear to be viable arguments that he could not control distribution of the
funds from the trust.
[Vol. 104
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In fact, in Pisani, the court, quoting Rev. Proc. 68-19,72 stated:
The service will presume in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary that contributions to a political candidate are political
funds, which are not intended for unrestricted personal use of
such recipient. If it can be shown that the funds were intended
for the unrestricted personal use of the political candidate, then
the Service will apply the principles set forth in Commissioner
v. []Duberstein ... .73
One might ask what the Clintons' position could be other than the seem-
ingly glib answer that contributions to the legal trust are gifts. However, their
position clearly appears to be that the contributions are gifts. The law firm Sul-
livan & Cromwell, which drafted the first trust, took the position that the trans-
fers were not made to help a public official carry out official duties because the
legal problems arose before the President took office.74  This argument is ap-
parently attempting to avoid the Revenue Rulings, which indicate that contribu-
tions which aid in carrying out official duties lack donative intent. Also, law-
yers for the second trust appear to have decided that the transfers are to be
treated as gifts to the Clintons rather than income.75 This line of reasoning leads
to an obvious query: Is helping Bill and Hillary Clinton with attorneys' fees
related to their official duties because it enables them to function and restore
their reputations?
76
2. Teamsters (O'Malley)
It is hard to resist arguing that the Clintons are in a worse position than
Thomas O'Malley, a Teamsters pension fund trustee indicted for taking part in a
conspiracy to bribe a United States Senator.77 In O'Malley v. Commissioner,78
the Tax Court held that (1) O'Malley had income when the pension fund paid
his legal fees in the unsuccessful defense of the criminal prosecution for con-
72 1968-1 C.B. 810.
73 United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 406 (2d. Cir. 1985) (quoting Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1
C.B. 810, 811).
74 See Sheppard, supra note 9, at 13.
75 See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1228.
76 See id. at 1229. See also infra notes 198-203 and accompanying text. There is some
support for the position that, if defending one's business reputation generates legal expenses,
such expenses resulted from a legal claim originating from one's trade or business. See Jenkins
v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 238 (1983) (The Conway Twitty case). See also infra notes 126-
133 and accompanying text.
77 See O'Malley v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 352 (1988).
78 91 T.C. 352 (1988).
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spiracy to commit bribery,79 and (2) O'Malley could deduct the legal fees, paid
by the pension fund on his behalf as ordinary and necessary business expenses
of an employee.80 O'Malley argued that no income should be attributed to him
because the legal expenses were really those of the pension fund.81 However,
the court disagreed and held that the legal expenses were personal to O'Malley
because the pension fund was not a defendant and it was not shown that the pen-
sion fund knew or directed O'Malley's criminal activity.82 In fact, the court
held that, even if the pension fund knew or directed the activity, it was not a
party to the criminal prosecution. 83 Most of the contributors to the Clintons'
fund, it is hoped, are neither parties to their legal proceedings nor directed or
knew of the activities which are the subject of those law suits.84
The O'Malley case is important for an analysis of the Clintons' tax
situation for two other reasons: employee business expenses and the alternative
minimum tax, both of which will be discussed below.85 The court held that
there was "a significant connection between the activities for which Mr.
O'Malley was indicted and his employment" and reasoned that "a taxpayer may
be in the trade or business of being an employee and, as such, may deduct busi-
ness expenses which no employer directs him to incur." 86 The court also added
that "[d]eregulation threatened to affect the profitability of Mr. O'Malley's em-
ployer, and hence, threatened the security of his employment position."87 Con-
sequently, the court held that the legal expenses were deductible as employee
business expenses because they were associated closely enough with the tax-
payer's business of being an employee.88 Although the court held the deduction
was an itemized deduction, there was not an alternative minimum tax problem
under the old alternative minimum tax for the 1981 and 1982 income tax
years.89 Under the current alternative minimum tax, however, the Clintons
79 See id. at 361.
80 See id. at 366.
81 See id. at 359.
82 See id. at 359-60.
83 See id. at 360.
94 The Clinton situation could only involve so many government employees or friends who
might contribute and might have their own legal problems. See Ann Devroy & Ruth Marcus,
Clinton Aides Setting Up Defense Funds to Pay Lawyers' Bills, WASH. POST, Feb. 29, 1996, at
Al; Lewis, supra note 2, at A15.
85 See infra notes 119-203 and accompanying text.
86 O'Malley, 91 T.C. at 363-64 (citing Primuth v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 374 (1970)).
87 Id. at 364.
88 See id. at 366.
89 See id. at 366. See also Groetzinger v. Comm'r, 771 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1985).
[Vol. 104
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss1/7
THE CLINTONS' LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
likely face an AMT problem. 90
3. Nixon (Carson)
Rather than relying on a case involving the Teamsters, the Clintons are
probably relying on an IRS position refuted in an earlier Tax Court case, Carson
v. Commissioner.9' Carson tangentially involved another president who, on a
side note, was tied to the Teamsters politically: Richard Nixon.92 As mentioned,
one might regard the Clinton attorneys' and trustees' assertions that the contri-
butions to the legal defense fund were gifts rather glib until examining this case,
which was apparently used as a stalking horse for cases involving contributors,
among others, to the Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), which was
President Nixon's fund raising committee.93
In Carson, the taxpayers contributed to, or expended funds for, cam-
paign committees for a number of candidates in and around Kansas City, Kan-
sas, and the IRS asserted a gift tax deficiency against the taxpayers. 94 The tax-
payer husband was both an investor in oil and gas producing properties and an
attorney in a law firm with prominent governmental clients.95 The court stated,
"These facts do not suggest a gift to the candidate, but the use of petitioner's
resources to promote the social framework petitioner considered most auspi-
cious to the attainment of his objectives in life. 96
Thus, the court concluded that petitioner/taxpayer David Carson did not
make taxable gifts because he did not have a disinterested motive. In its analy-
sis, the court considered the issue as a question of fact, although the court did
not cite Duberstein or Pisani or the IRS rulings discussed above.97 The court
supported its conclusion by reasoning that ':[t]his review of the legislative his-
tory of the gift tax clearly demonstrates that it was intended to backstop the es-
90 The Clintons' possible alternative minimum tax problem is discussed in Part IV below.
See infra notes 204-49 and accompanying text.
91 71 T.C. 252 (1978), affd, 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), nonacq., 1971-2 C.B. 2.
92 The Teamsters endorsed Richard Nixon for President in 1972. See, e.g., Lionel Van
Deerlin, Marriage of Convenience on Rocks, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 5, 1988, at B7.
93 See Carson, 71 T.C. 252 (1978), aff'd, 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981) nonacq. 1971-2
C.B.2. See also infra note 104 and accompanying text. The suggestion that the Clintons
would look to Nixon as a model is not that farfetched. Hillary Clinton served as a young attor-
ney on the staff of the Democrats' attorney for the Senate Nixon impeachment committee. See
The Daily Telegraph, How Hillary Tried to Save Nixon: First Lady has Experience With Im-
peachment, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 11, 1998, at A3.
94 See Carson, 71 T.C. at 253-54.
95 See id. at 256.
96 Id. at 258.
97 See id.
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tate tax." 98 The court's reading of legislative history may be strained.
Judge Tannenwald, concurring, joined by Raum and Sterrett, would
have held there was no gift "absent a familial or other personal relationship be-
tween a candidate and his benefactor." 99  Judge Hall, concurring, joined by
Drennan and Goffe, thought an expenditure for "propagation of views of politi-
cal policy" was "no more a gift to the recipient than is an expenditure for a
newspaper advertisement a gift to the paper."' ° The dissenters, Judges Simp-
son, Chabot, and Quealy, would have held that the transfers benefiting the social
framework could be gifts. 10 '
The court also noted that, with regard to transfers after May 7, 1974, the
gift tax was made inapplicable to transfers to political organizations by I.R.C. §
2501(a)(5).' 0 2 The Carson case remains relevant, however, because the trans-
fers to the Clintons' legal trust are not to a political organization but to individu-
als. Additionally, although the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court in Carson,
the IRS did not acquiesce in the Carson cases. 0 3 As mentioned above, the Car-
son case involved contributions to less prominent politicians and, therefore, may
have been used as a stalking horse for contributions to other politicians.1t 4
98 Id. at 261. Although the Supreme Court in Duberstein may have suggested that there are
differences in the definition of "gift" for income tax purposes and gift purposes and despite the
fact that the definitional language is different, the two definitions are similar and many courts,
including the Carson court, seem to act, with good reason, it seems, as if there is no or little
difference. See id.; Comm'r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284. In Duberstein, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority concerning the income tax definition of "gift," stated: "Analogies and
inferences drawn from other revenue provisions, such as estate and gift taxes, are dubious." Id.
at 286. However, Justice Brennan also rejected "donative intent" and required "an objective
inquiry" of a gift. Id. Similarly, in Comm'r v. Wemyss, 65 U.S. 652 (1945), the Supreme Court,
in defining "gift" for gift tax purposes rejected, donative intent and required an objective in-
quiry.
The two definitions of "gift," of course, arise from different statutory sources, I.R.C. §
102 for income tax and I.R.C. § 2512(b) for gift tax. Definitionless § 102 has resulted in inter-
pretations such as Duberstein's "disinterested and detached generosity." On the other hand, §
2512(b) actually provides the definition "less than an adequate and full consideration." If in
practicality there is any real difference in these definitions, it seems difficult to fathom. For
example, when the court ruled in Carson that transfers to politicians were, by an objective test,
to influence the social framework and therefore not gifts under the gift tax, aren't such same
transfers not with a disinterested and detached motive to qualify as gifts under the income tax?
99 Carson, 71 T.C. at 264 (Tannenwald, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 265 (Hall, J., concurring).
101 See id. at 275 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
102 See id. at 257 n.5.
103 See id.
104 See Kip Dellinger, Let's See an IRS Ruling on Clinton Legal Defense Fund, 94 TAx
NoTEs TODAY 141-64 (1994), in which the author explains the following:
In the mid-'70s, I found myself in the ironic position of representing
different contributors to each party who were challenged by the IRS.
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Thus, the Clintons are apparently relying on an IRS position used against tax-
payers and rejected by the Tax Court. This presents an interesting question of
whether the IRS will seek to audit the Clintons' tax returns when the Service's
own position is that there was no income, only potential gift tax.
D. A Crummey Problem (Crummey and Cristofani)
Even if the Clintons prevail in their argument discussed above, and the
transfers to their legal defense trust are gifts, the gifts would still need to be gifts
of a present interest for the transferors to claim the gift tax exclusion of $10,000
per donee per year under I.R.C. § 2503(b). 10 5 According to Crummey v. Com-
missioner 1 6 and its progeny, the beneficiary of a gift to a trust receives a present
interest, which qualifies for the $10,000 annual exclusion, if the beneficiary has
a legally unrestricted present right to demand that the trustee distribute the prop-
erty to him.'0 7 In Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner,10 8 one of Crummey's
progeny, the Tax Court held that five minor contingent remainder beneficiaries
received a present interest when they had a right to withdraw funds for a limited
time of fifteen days.' 9 Under the Clintons' second legal defense fund, there is
apparently a power to withdraw funds that lapses within thirty days of contribu-
tion. This lapsing power would seem to satisfy Crummey and Cristofani.
However, the Clintons have apparently provided a letter to the trustees
saying they will not exercise their power to withdraw funds." 0 It is not clear
whether this letter, an advance notice to the Trustees, could deny present interest
treatment to the transfers. In Estate of Holland v. Commissioner,"' a failure to
notify minor beneficiaries constituted merely a factor in the likelihood of with-
The amounts involved exceeded $700,000. Interestingly, our arguments
and those made by others challenged on these donations followed along
the lines that there was no donative intent involved; that, in fact, the
donors intended to gain something from their contributions. That
something was to advance their own political and social objectives.
The Carson case (Carson v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 252 (1978), aff'd 641
F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), nonacq 1979-2 C.B. 2) arrived at essentially
the same conclusion. In all three of the cases I was involved with, they
were placed in suspense and the proposed assessment later withdrawn.
See also Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532.
105 See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1994). See also Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1226-28.
106 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
107 See id. at 82.
108 97 T.C. 74 (1991).
109 See id. at 74.
110 See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1226.
I1 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3236 (1997).
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drawal, rather than denial of the right to withdraw. 12 The court then held there
was a present interest. 13 In dicta, however, the court agreed with the IRS that a
tacit understanding in advance not to exercise withdrawal rights might negate a
present interest, but found the facts were otherwise. 
14
The fact that the Clintons may have agreed in advance in writing not to
withdraw funds raises the question of whether they received a present interest
for gift tax purposes. However, at least one commentator has argued that, when
the trust pays the legal bills, there is a constructive distribution to the Clintons,
thereby negating their express agreement not to withdraw. 
15
E. Unfairness (Paula Jones)
One unanswered question from this section is whether the Clintons' tax
returns, which do not report the contributions to the legal defense funds as in-
come, will ever be audited by the IRS in light of its position in Carson that the
contributions are gifts. Paula Jones, Bill Clinton's nemesis in the sexual har-
assment lawsuit, also established a legal fund. 16 Her tax return, however, was
selected for examination, possibly, according to one commentator, because of
her legal fund and the issues associated with it. 117 As that commentator points
out, if the IRS does not audit the Clintons' returns, an issue of fairness may
arise.'' 8
III. DEDUCTION OF LEGAL EXPENSES
A. Introduction: The General Rules - Gilmore and More (Jenkins and Salt)
If the transfers to the Clintons' legal defense fund are income, then the
next logical question becomes whether they can deduct payments made out of
that income as a legal expense. In the area of deductions, the Clintons' potential
tax problems seem to involve a number of leading cases, possibly indicating that
the nature of these issues go to the fundamentals of tax law. Legal expenses are
deductible only if they arise out of a trade or business or an income-producing
112 See id. at 3237.
113 See id.
114 See id. (stating that "if the beneficiaries, trustees, and donor had an agreement or under-
standing that limited the ability in the legal sense, of the beneficiaries to exercise their right to
withdraw the trust corpus, then the beneficiaries may not have received gifts of a present inter-
est").
115 See Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1227-28.
116 See Kip Dellinger, The Clinton Legal Defense Funds: Tax Return Compliance Issues, 78
TAX NoTEs 1719, 1726 (1998).
117 See id.
118 See id.
[Vol. 104
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss1/7
THE CLINTONS' LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
activity." 9 The determination of whether a claim arises out of a trade or busi-
ness, deductible under I.R.C. § 162, or an income-producing activity, deductible
under I.R.C. § 212, depends on several factors.12 0
Interpreting these provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a landmark
case, United States v. Gilmore,'21 set forth the basic test for deductibility of legal
expenses: the origin of the claim test. 122 The Court stated that "the origin and
character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather
than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the control-
ling basic test of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal' and hence
whether it is deductible or not.0 23 One court has suggested that these factors
include "the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the litigation, the de-
fenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions were expended,
the background of the litigation, and all facts pertaining to the controversy."'
124
Therefore, in determining whether legal expenses are deductible, the issue of
whether the expenses are business related or personal depend on how connected
the legal expenses are to trade or business or income-producing activity. 125
Two key cases show how courts have extended the concept of connect-
edness. In Jenkins v. Commissioner,126 the Tax Court allowed country western
music singer, Conway Twitty,127 to deduct payments 128 that he made on behalf
of his Twitty Burger Restaurants purportedly to protect his music business repu-
tation. 29 The Jenkins court held that "Conway Twitty repaid the investors in
Twitty Burger with the primary motive of protecting his personal business repu-•,,130 cocld
tation and concluded that "there was a proximate relationship between the
payments made to the holders of Twitty Burger debentures and the petitioner's
See I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1994). Additionally, personal expenditures are not deductible
under I.R.C. § 262 (1994).
120 See I.R.C. §§ 162, 212 (1994).
121 372 U.S. 39 (1963), rev'g 290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
122 See id.
123 Id. at 49.
124 Boagni v. Comm'r, 59 T.C. 708, 713 (1973).
125 See generally John R. Dorocak, Sports and Entertainment Figures (and Others) May be
Able to Deduct Legal Expenses for Criminal Prosecutions (and Wrongful Death Suits), 13
AKRONTAxJ. 1 (1997).
126 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 238 (1983).
127 Conway Twitty's legal name is Harold Jenkins. See id. at 238.
128 Although these payments were debts to third parties, rather than legal expenses, the case
provides guidance for deducting legal expenses because both are deducted as trade or business
expenses under I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
129 See Jenkins, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 238.
130 Id. at 244.
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trade or business as a country music entertainer so as to render those payments
an ordinary and necessary expense of the business."' 
3
'
In Jenkins, there was testimony from a country music expert and the pe-
titioner himself that, in the words of the expert, "a country entertainer's charac-
ter, personality, and credit reputation are part and parcel of his role as a
singer."'132 (Or, to suggest a possible lyric to be sung with a deep resonating
male voice - ala, say, Waylon Jennings: In country music, your reputation is
everything.) Apparently, the testimony was persuasive because the court con-
cluded poetically,
Had Conway not repaid the investors
His career would have been under a cloud,
Under the unique facts of this case
Held: The deductions are allowed.
133
Also, in Salt v. Commissioner,'34 the Tax Court allowed a movie script
writer to deduct his legal expenses incurred in appearing before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities, which was investigating charges of
Communist infiltration in the motion picture industry. 135 The Salt court ex-
plained, in language that also might be helpful to the Clintons:
Applying here the reasoning and expression used in the Hein-
inger case, supra, 'Upon being served' with a subpoena to ap-
pear before the Committee, petitioner 'was confronted with a
new business problem which involved' his present and future
business welfare. Ordinary business prudence demanded that
petitioner employ counsel to advise with and represent him in
such an emergency.
136
B. Politicians, Sexual Harassment, and the Gilmore Test for Deducting
Legal Expenses
1. Politicians and Professionals: McDonald, Lussy, Messina,
McDonald, & Soloman
There are cases involving situations more specific to politicians and
131 Id. at 246.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 247 n. 14.
134 18 T.C. 182 (1952).
135 See id. at 184-85.
136 Id. at 186.
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sexual harassment defendants deducting legal expenses than Jenkins and Salt
that may be even more apropos to the Clintons.137 In McDonald v. Commis-
sioner,'38 for instance, the Supreme Court ruled that a judge seeking office could
not deduct campaign expenses as expenditures in his trade or business. 139 Yet,
in Commissioner v. Heininger,14° the Supreme Court held that a dentist, who
sold dentures by mail and had been charged by the Postmaster General with a
fraud order for false claims about his wares, could deduct legal expenses for the
unsuccessful fight against the fraud order. 1
41
Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 71-470, 142 a public official was permitted
to deduct the cost of defending himself against a voter recall. 14 3 The IRS rea-
soned in the Ruling that the taxpayer was merely defending his current position
rather than campaigning for a new term of office.' 44 The Service distinguished
campaign expenditures, which are not deductible under McDonald v. Commis-
sioner, from the expenses of defending one's business, which are deductible
under Commission v. Heininger. 145
In Revenue Ruling 74-394146 the Service also ruled that a judge could
deduct the costs of defending himself against charges of misconduct while in
office. 147 The IRS cited another leading case, Commissioner v. Tellier,148 for the
137 See David R. Brennan & Susan L. Megaard, Deducting Legal Costs of Defending Against
Claims of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 84 J. TAX'N 94 (1996); Sheppard, supra note 9,
at 12-14; Robert W. Wood, Letters to the Editor: The Taxing Matter of Bill's Legal Bills, 78
TAX NOTES 1567, 1567 (1998).
138 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
139 See McDonald, 323 U.S. at 63-65. Currently, I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)(B) (2001) prohibits
deductions of any amount paid in connection with any candidate for public office. See also
Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,112 (Sept. 27, 1979) (regarding a public official deducting legal ex-
penses for defense in a lawsuit regarding statements and release of documents).
140 320 U.S. 467 (1943). Heininger was cited by Salt v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 182 (1952),
discussed above. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
141 See Heininger, 320 U.S. at 470-71. See also Theodore M. David, Getting Away With
Murder? Deductibility of Criminal Defense Expenses, 10 PRAC. TAX LAW. 63, 70-71 (1996).
142 1971-2 C.B. 121.
143 See id. at 121.
144 See id.
145 See id. (citing McDonald v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 57 (1944) and Comm'r v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467 (1943)).
146 1974-2 C.B. 40.
147 See id. at 40. The facts of this ruling differ from McDonald because in the ruling the judge
was merely defending against charges of misconduct after he was in office, while in McDonald,
the judge was trying to get elected to office. The trade or businesses of the two taxpayers were
different. See id.
148 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
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proposition that legal expenses in the defense of a business-related criminal
prosecution, as distinguished from the Postmaster General's fraud order, were
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 49 In Tellier, the tax-
payer mounted an unsuccessful defense to a criminal prosecution for violations
of the fraud section of the Securities Acts of 1933 and the mail fraud statute. 150
In the Ruling, the IRS also distinguished McDonald as involving expenditures
"in seeking election" but "not incurred in carrying on his business of 'judg-
ing. iii
l5
The opposite of an expenditure connected with a trade or business is one
which is personal. Personal expenditures are not deductible under I.R.C. §
262. 152 Often, the cases on deductibility of legal expenses turn on whether they
are connected, on the one hand, to a trade or business or, on the other hand, to
personal activities. A number of cases have denied deductions of legal expenses
where the expenses, according to the courts, were from personal activities. And,
somewhat similar to issues that could arise in a Clinton case, these cases even
include "sexual perversion" and political candidates, government employees,
attorneys, and other professionals. In Lussy v. Commissioner, 53 for example, an
unsuccessful candidate for local property tax appraiser sued a police officer who
noted on a traffic ticket that the taxpayer said he was in an undesirable area
looking for a woman. 154 Taxpayer Lussy later attempted to deduct the legal fees
of his suit for defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.15 5 The Tax Court held that "the origin of the claim was a per-
sonal matter and not connected with petitioner's real estate appraisal busi-
ness."
156
Similarly, in Messina v. United States,157 the taxpayer-plaintiff, an em-
ployee of the California Department of Human Resources, tried to deduct legal
expenses of defending against an unsuccessful prosecution for sexual perver-
sion. 1 58 The Court of Claims explained the Gilmore test: "The test might be
149 See Rev. Rul. 74-394, 1974-2 C.B. 40 (citing Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966)).
150 See Tellier, 383 U.S. at 687.
151 Rev. Rul. 74-394, 1974-2 C.B. 41, 41.
152 I.R.C. § 162 (1994). Section 162(a) provides that "[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business." Id.
153 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 427 (1995).
15 See id. at 428.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 429. According to the court, "[t]he lawsuit arose from a traffic violation that was
unrelated to petitioner's income-producing activities." Id.
157 202 Ct. Cl. 155 (1973).
158 See id. at 157-58. The charge of sexual perversion was not described any further in the re-
ported case. See id.
[Vol. 104
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss1/7
THE CLINTONS' LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
more simply viewed as looking to the origin of the operative facts leading to the
litigation rather than the effects of the litigation on the taxpayer."' 59 Then the
court denied the deduction, holding that "the legal fees were spent to defend a
criminal charge that arose out of personal conduct."'
60
Although some may claim that Bill Clinton may have been looking for a
woman as was taxpayer Lussy, 161 or involved in a situation somewhat similar to
Messina, 162 Bill Clinton's legal problems are easily distinguishable from the
situations Lussy and Messina were involved in. Many of his legal expenses
were incurred in a civil suit for sexual harassment brought by Paula Jones 63 and
for lying under oath, both to the district court hearing the Jones case in Arkansas
and to the grand jury in Washington D.C., when he was questioned by the inde-
pendent counsel regarding the Jones case and his testimony, particularly as it
related to White House intern Monica Lewinsky.164 Thus, applying the Gilmore
159 Id. at 159.
160 Id.
161 See Lussy, 70 T.C.M. at 428.
162 See Messina, 202 Ct. Cl. at 157.
163 See Jackson supra note 13, at A22 ("The Clintons' legal obligations totaled about $10.5
million from independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr's inquiry, the Paula Corbin Jones sexual
harassment lawsuit and the congressional impeachment battle .... ).
164 If anyone doubts that Clinton lied under oath, District Court Judge Susan Webber Wright,
in holding Clinton in civil contempt of court, concluded, "Simply put, the President's deposi-
tion testimony regarding whether he had ever been alone with Ms. Lewinsky was intentionally
false and his statements regarding whether he had ever engaged in se ual relton with Ms.
Lewinsky likewise were intentionally false." Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (E.D.
Ark. 1999). Judge Wright later ordered Clinton to pay over $90,000 ($90,686.05) in court costs
and opposing counsels' fees. See Jones v. Clinton, 57 F. Supp. 2d 719, 729 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
Judge Wright, and some members of Congress, apparently concluded that Clinton also lied in
his grand jury testimony since Judge Wright also wrote, "At his August 17th appearance before
the grand jury, the President directly contradicted his deposition testimony by acknowledging
that he had indeed been alone with Ms. Lewinsky on a number of occasions during which they
engaged in 'inappropriate intimate contact."' Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
In a footnote, she explained as follows:
The President seemed to accept OIC's characterization of his improper
contact with Ms. Lewinsky as "some kind of sex" and as a "physically
intimate" relationship. Pres. GJ Test. at 123, 136. Although the Presi-
dent did not disclose any specific sexual acts between himself and Ms.
Lewinsky, he did state that oral sex performed by Ms. Lewinsky on
himself would not constitute "sexual relations" as that term was de-
fined by plaintiff at his deposition. Id. at 93, 100, 102, 104-05, 15 1-52,
168. It appears the President is asserting that Ms. Lewinsky could be
having sex with him while, at the same time, he was not having sex
with her.
Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 n.16.
Also, Judge Wright succinctly summarized the conclusions of the independent counsel, the
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test, "[T]he origin[s] of the operative facts leading to the litigation" for Bill
Clinton were in employment situations. Paula Jones was an Arkansas state em-
ployee when Clinton was employed as governor 65 and Monica Lewinsky was a
White House intern166 when Clinton was employed as President. Additionally,
it should be noted that Hillary Clinton, however, may have to strain a bit more
to connect her legal expenses to employment. She was employed by the Rose
Law Firm but not, presumably, by the White House.
167
Yet, professionals are not immune to legal expenses being classified as
personal. For example, in a different McDonald v. Commissioner,168 this one a
Second Circuit case, the court denied an attorney's deduction for a settlement
House, and the Senate. See generally Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118. In addition, she called atten-
tion to Clinton's settlement payment to Jones of $850,000. See id. at 1123.
On September 9, 1998, the Independent Counsel, having concluded there
was substantial and credible information that the President committed
acts that may constitute grounds for impeachment, submitted his findings
from his investigation of the Lewinsky matter to the United States House
of Representatives pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(c). The House of Repre-
sentatives thereupon commenced impeachment proceedings, ultimately
passing two Articles of Impeachment against the President, one alleging
perjury in his August 17th testimony before the grand jury and the other
alleging obstruction of justice in this civil case. The matter then pro-
ceeded to trial in the United States Senate. On November 13, 1998, while
the impeachment proceedings were taking place in the House of Repre-
sentatives, the plaintiff reached an out-of-court settlement for $850,000
and withdrew her appeal of this Court's April 1st decision granting sum-
mary judgment to defendants. See Jones v. Clinton, 161 F.3d 528 (8th
Cir 1998); 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. Thereafter, on February 12, 1999, the
Senate acquitted the President of both Articles of Impeachment.
See id. at 1130. Perhaps most damningly, Clinton's own attorney had to admit to Judge Wright
that his client's testimony was "misleading and not true."
Indeed, even though the President's testimony at his civil deposition
was entirely consistent with Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying "sexual
relations" between herself and the President, the President's attorney
later notified this Court pursuant to his professional responsibility that
portions of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit were reported to be "misleading
and not true" and that this Court should not rely on Ms. Lewinsky's af-
fidavit or remarks of counsel characterizing that affidavit. See Letter
of September 30, 1998. The President's testimony at his deposition that
Ms. Lewinsky's denial in her affidavit of a "sexual relationship" be-
tween them was "absolutely true" likewise was "misleading and not
true."
Jones, 36 F. Supp 2d at 1130 n.15.
165 See Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1120 & n.2.
166 See id. at 1121.
167 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
168 592 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1978).
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paid to avert a threatened lawsuit contesting the will in which several bequests
were made to that attorney. 69 Similarly, in Solomon v. Commissioner,170 not
Dr. Soliman's case involving his home office,'' the Supreme Court denied an
accountant's deduction of expenses to settle a lawsuit for alleged misappropria-
tion of funds of his father's, over which the taxpayer argued he was a trustee.
72
Yet, Bill Clinton's legal expenses with regard to Paula Jones and Monica
Lewinsky do not appear to involve the type of familial situation involved in
McDonald and Soloman, and therefore, would not pose a problem to deductibil-
ity.
2. Sexual Harassment and the "Furtherance" Test
Some might argue that Bill Clinton's sexual harassment of Paula Jones
while he was governor or lying under oath regarding Monica Lewinsky while he
was president did not "further" his business as an employee government offi-
cial.' 7 The Tax Court adopted this furtherance of the business test in a 1988
memorandum opinion, Oden v. Commissioner,174 in which the court denied de-
ductibility of legal costs incurred defending against a defamation suit."75 In
Oden, the jury found that a sole proprietor florist maliciously defamed a former
employee when two prospective employers requested references. 176 Because the
jury found that the defamatory statements were made with malice, the Tax Court
held that the legal expenses were not deductible because they did not further the
florist's business. 77 The court distinguished Tellier, where a deduction was
allowed for legal expenses in a criminal prosecution for violations of fraud un-
der the Securities Act of 1933, because there the fraud furthered the securities
business. 178
Earlier, in 1934, the Ninth Circuit, in Pantages Theatre Co. v. Welch,
179
held that a corporation could not deduct legal expenses incurred while defending
its president against a criminal charge of raping a prospective employee during a
169 See id. at 637-38.
170 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 588 (1974).
171 See Soliman v. Comm'r, 506 U.S. 168 (1993), rev'g 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), 94 T.C.
20 (1990).
172 See Solomon, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 588.
173 See Brennan & Megaard, supra note 137.
174 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 851 (1988).
175 See id. at 853.
176 See id. at 851-52.
177 See id. at 853.
178 See id.
179 71 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1934).
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job interview because the legal expenses were not ordinary and necessary as
they did not further the corporation's business. 80 Pantages, however, is some-
what distinguishable, both legally and factually, from Bill Clinton's situation
because (1) it predates and conflicts with the leading cases of Gilmore and Tel-
lier; (2) the rape originated from a job interview; (3) there was no liability for
the corporation paying the expenses, although there is such liability in sexual
harassment; and (4) the Pantages president did not pay his own legal ex-
penses.'
81
Furthermore, the Tax Court itself, in a 1980 regular opinion, (pre-Oden)
appears to have rejected, or at least limited, the furtherance test in Dancer v.
Commissioner,i1 2 a case in which a taxpayer horse trainer was sued after he hit
and injured a child while driving his car from a farm, where he trained horses, to
his home office. 8 3 The court held that the legal settlement costs were deducti-
ble and reasoned that the car trip was integral to the business and, even if it did
not further the business, the payment was insignificant.184 However, Dancer is
distinguishable from Oden on at least two grounds: the significance of the pay-
ment and the fact that the activity (driving versus raping) was a part of the busi-
ness.
Although the Service appears to have at one point taken an audit posi-
tion that legal expenses of defending against sexual harassment are not deducti-
ble because the sexual conduct does not further the business, other courts still
have not adopted this reasoning, and the Tax Court itself has ignored it at
times. I8 5 In Clark v. Commissioner,186 for example, also an older (1958) regular
Tax Court opinion, a magazine subscription company manager paid legal fees in
defense of both criminal and civil suits involving an alleged sexual attack on a
female applicant during a job interview.' 87 The Court held that the taxpayer-
manager was allowed to deduct his legal expenses of defending against the later
dismissed criminal charge and his settlement costs in a civil suit. 188 Also, in
1979, the year before Dancer, a General Counsel's Memorandum 189 stated asfollows:
180 See id. at 68.
181 See Brennan & Megaard, supra note 137, at "Problems with the Furtherance Test."
182 73 T.C. 1103 (1980).
183 See id. at 1103.
184 See id. at 1108-09.
185 See id.
186 30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
187 See id. at 1332-33.
188 See id. at 1336-37.
189 Hereinafter "G.C.M."
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Moreover, even though the particular acts bringing about the
criminal charges were beyond the scope of the taxpayer's duties
of employment and were performed for his personal profit to
the detriment of the interest of his employer and his position of
employment, nevertheless, such charges and the consequent le-
gal costs may find their source in the taxpayer's profit-seeking
activities or the character of the conduct from which such
charges arise may be of a "business" nature. If either the source
of the charges is in his profit-seeking activities or the character
of the charges is of a business nature, the ensuing defense costs
will be deductible. 1
90
Two commentators, writing together, have indicated that determining
whether legal expenses regarding sexual harassment are deductible depend on
the nature of the claim, which taken altogether form a continuum of types of
sexual harassment.' 9 ' Claims may arise (1) at the workplace, (2) on business
trips, or at business meetings or at a client's or customer's work location, (3)
with the employer-corporation as defendant, (4) or after work (a romantic rela-
tionship) with retaliation at work, or finally, (5) in some way unrelated to the
taxpayer's business. 192
Along these lines, in Finger v. United States,93 a district court denied
the deduction of legal expenses to a doctor-taxpayer incurred in defending
against a lawsuit brought by his nurse's husband for loss of consortium and
medical expenses. 94 The husband claimed the taxpayer addicted his wife to
narcotics, had sexual relations with her, and performed an abortion on her.
95
The nurt held the lan suit arose out of th t-payer's persol relations and,
therefore, the legal expenses of the lawsuit were not deductible. 9 6 However, at
least one commentary has suggested that the taxpayer in Finger could have de-
ducted the legal expenses if the wife-nurse had brought a lawsuit because her
claim was related to the doctor's business, or arose in it, although the husband's
claim was not so business related but rather "personal."'' 97 Under the commen-
190 Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,112 (Sept. 27, 1979).
191 See Brennan & Megaard, supra note 137, at "Deductions in Harassment Cases."
192 See id.
193 257 F. Supp. 312 (D.S.C. 1966).
194 See id. at 313.
195 See id. at 313-14 n.2.
19 See id. at 314.
197 See Brennan & Megaard, supra note 137, at "Deductions in Harassment Cases."
If a claim arising from personal activities results in a claim unrelated to
the taxpayer's business, however, the legal expenses will be nondeduct-
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tary's intricate interpretation of Finger, Bill Clinton's defense expenses regard-
ing the Jones litigation and subsequent grand jury investigation would still be
deductible as related to his business of, at least, being governor, or possibly,
being President, as discussed immediately below.
C. Gilmore, the Clintons, and Deducting Legal Expenses
Bill Clinton's legal expenses, arising from testifying to the grand jury
when questioned by the independent counsel and from lying in a deposition in
the Jones case while President, seem clearly connected to, or arising in, his trade
or business of being employed as President under the Gilmore test of origin of
the claim. Furthermore, Bill Clinton's legal expenses in defending against the
sexual harassment lawsuit brought by Paula Jones also are related to a claim
with its origin in his trade or business, this time because he was governor of
Arkansas at the time of the alleged harassment. Or, as one commentator has
suggested, the cost of protecting his reputation while President, by defending
against the Jones' lawsuit, may be deductible under Gilmore as connected to the
trade or business of being President because protection of reputation is neces-
sary to carry on that trade or business. 98 There is some authority, such as the
Jenkins case discussed previously,' 99 to support the proposition that legal ex-
penses to defend one's reputation are deductible, where reputation is closely
related to the taxpayer's employment.2° It would be logical to conclude that it
is very important for a president to maintain his or her reputation.
The fact that Bill Clinton's behavior was not in furtherance of his em-
ployers' interests does not appear relevant to deductibility under Gilmore,
Dancer, Clark, and G.C.M. 38,112, despite Oden and Pantages Theatre. How-
ever, if Bill Clinton's behavior had to be in furtherance of his employers' inter-
ible. The court in Finger thus denied a doctor's deduction for legal fees
because (I) the claim originated from the doctor's personal relations with
his office nurse and (2) the claim by the nurse's husband for loss of con-
sortium was unrelated to the doctor's business. See Finger, 257 F. Supp.
312. It is the relation of the claim to the taxpayer's business and not the
nature of the claimant's injury that determines the deductibility of the
taxpayer's legal costs. For example, an additional claim by the nurse's
husband seeking lost wages for his wife would not have made Finger's
legal expenses deductible, because the husband's claims were unrelated
to Finger's medical practice. By contrast, had the nurse herself charged
Finger with either harassment or tortious conduct in the workplace, pre-
sumably the fees would have been deductible.
Id.
198 See Sheppard, supra note 9, at 15; Sheppard, supra note 14, at 1229-30.
199 See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
200 See generally Jenkins v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. 238 (1983) (The Conway Twitty case);
Draper v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 201 (1956); Dorocak, supra note 125.
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ests, per Oden and Pantages Theater, his potential deduction of legal expenses
would seem thwarted. Perhaps one way to distinguish Oden and Pantages from
the other authority is that they involve wrongs or crimes, specifically malicious
defamation and rape, which are clearly not part of doing business.20 1 Even this
attempted distinction may fail in light of Gilmore's origin of the claim language
and similar language in G.C.M. 38,112.202 Consequently, Bill Clinton will
probably be able to deduct the legal expenses if they are income. Finally, if any
of Hillary Clinton's legal expenses have been paid by the trusts, 20 3 she would
similarly have to link the origin of her expenses to employment of hers. The
position of first lady, however, does not appear to be one of an employee or a
trade or business, and therefore might have a more difficult time in deducting
her legal expenses paid by the trusts.
IV. ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX AND THE EXCLUSION FROM INCOME OF
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IN TRUST
A. The AMT Problem: Attorney's Fees as Non-Deductible Miscellaneous
Itemized Deductions
At this point, it should seem clear that the Clintons have income under
the longstanding rules, such as Old Colony Trust, for the payments of their legal
expenses by their second legal defense trust and can likely take an offsetting
deduction of those legal expenses paid. Legal expenses of an employee are de-
ducted as itemized deductions, below the line, under miscellaneous itemized
deductions subject to the 2% of AGI floor.204 Employee business expenses,
however, are not deductible for the AMT and thus are addedac o taxale
income to reach alternative minimum taxable income. 20 5 An AMT problem
arises with the deduction of legal expenses, but also may present a solution.
Recently, some commentators have argued that winning plaintiffs in a lawsuit
could avoid the add back of deductible employee legal expenses, and, conse-
quently, avoid the AMT problem, by arguing that such plaintiff-taxpayers never
received income when their attorney's fees were a contingent percentage of their
201 See Oden v. Comm'r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 851, 851-52 (1988); Pantages Theatre Co. v.
Welch, 71 F.2d 68, 68 (9th Cir. 1934).
202 See supra notes 121-25, 189-90 and accompanying text.
203 See Jackson, supra note 13, at A22. See also Clines, supra note 3, at Al; supra note 2
and accompanying text.
204 See Alexander v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1792 (1995) (citing I.R.C. §§ 162(a) (trade
or business expenses deductible), 62(a)(1) (employee business expenses not deducted for AGI),
67(a) (imposing the 2% for miscellaneous itemized deductions)).
205 See id. at 1792 (citing I.R.C. §§ 55 and 56(b)(1) (disallowing miscellaneous itemized
deductions as defined in 67(b))). See also Kip Dellinger, The Clinton Legal Defense Fund: The
Tax Issue Remains Unanswered, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 159-44 (1997); Sheppard, supra note 2
at 472-474.
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lawsuit proceeds. 2°6
The Clintons, if they indeed have income from payment of the legal ex-
penses by the trust and a deduction for those expenses, will fall precisely within
the AMT disallowance of employee business expenses. However, the Clintons,
as defendants, might try an argument that they had no control over the funds of
the trust to extent the funds paid attorneys' fees. This argument has had some
success, as discussed below, when winning plaintiffs have argued that they have
no control over awards to the extent the awards pay attorneys' fees.
B. Cases Excluding Plaintiffs Attorney's Fees - Cotnam, Clarks, Baylin,
Coady, and Kenseth
For years taxpayers have faced the problem of income from lawsuit
awards and settlements, without always receiving a corresponding deduction for
legal expenses. As mentioned above, legal expenses, which are miscellaneous
itemized deductions as employee business expenses, are not deductible for the
AMT. °7 Plaintiff-taxpayers have attempted a variety of creative methods to
obtain the deduction or to exclude the portion of an award or settlement paid out
as their attorneys' fees.208 Although the Clintons are, as defendants, distin-
guishable from the plaintiffs who have succeeded in these attempts, some of the
theories used to exclude plaintiffs' legal fees may be used to exclude or deduct
their legal fees as defendants.
1. Cotnam
In the leading case for plaintiffs excluding legal fees from ai award,
Cotnam v. Commissioner,209 a purported legatee of an estate sued for a one-fifth
share. 2'0 A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit agreed that the award was for
past services rendered because the deceased had promised the plaintiff Cotnam a
206 See Fifth Circuit Reverses Tax Court - Contingent Attorney Fees From Settlement
Excluded From Gross Income, 88 TAx NOTES 640 (2000); Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering
Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 531 (2000); Robert
W. Wood, Even Tax Court Itself Divided on Attorneys' Fees Issue!, 88 TAx NOTEs 573 (2000);
Robert W. Wood, Letters to the Editor: Attorney's Fees: A Few More Observations, 88 TAx
NoTEs 701 (2000).
207 See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 206. This currently hot topic of whether a plaintiff-taxpayer can truly
deduct or exclude attorney's fees from an award or settlement is thoroughly discussed else-
where. See supra note 206. This topic is raised here only for the proposition that the Clintons
might try to use the theories being developed regarding plaintiff's legal fees to exclude or de-
duct their defendants' legal fees.
209 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
210 See id. at 119.
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one-fifth share of his estate if she cared for him for the rest of his life.21' How-
ever, the judges disagreed as to whether plaintiff Cotnam could include as in-
come her litigation award net of attorney's fees.21 Judge Wisdom dissented
believing that Helvering v. Horst,213 on assignment of income, and Old Colony
Trust, on payment of one's expenses by another, controlled and required income
214
recognition. '4 The majority, in effect, excluded the attorney's fees from Cot-
nam's award by allowing her to include only the net amount on the theories that
(1) plaintiff Cotnam had nothing to assign as income because her claim was
"worthless without the aid of skillful attorneys" 215 and (2) her obligation to
make payments of attorneys fees was only contingent and therefore outside Old
Colony Trust Co.216 Although Judge Wisdom dissented from the conclusion
regarding the attorney's fees, he wrote for the majority on whether the award
was a bequest or payment for past services.21 7 In doing so, Judge Wisdom
sought to categorize the majority's holding on the exclusion of the attorney's
fees from income as dependent upon the Alabama Attorney Lien Statute.218
2. Clarks
The Sixth Circuit has adopted the Cotnam result, but the Federal Cir-
cuit, Ninth Circuit, Third Circuit, and Tax Court have rejected Cotnam.21 9 In
Estate of Arthur Clarks v. United States220 the Sixth Circuit allowed a plaintiff to
exclude part of an award paid to his attorneys.221 A jury had awarded the plain-
tiff $5.6 million against K-Mart for head injuries, as well as another $5.7 million
in post-judgment interest.222 The $5.6 million was excluded as personal injury
damages under Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2) but the $5.7 million was in-
211 See id. at 122.
212 See id. at 127.
213 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
214 See id. at 127. See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Helver-
ing, 311 U.S. 112.
215 Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
216 See id. at 126.
217 See id. at 120-25.
218 See id. at 125.
219 See Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000); Coady v. Cornm'r, 213
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Baylin v. United Sates, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Kenseth v.
Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399 (2000).
220 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000).
221 See id. at 855.
222 See id.
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cludible.223 The court held that the plaintiff could exclude the $1.9 million of
contingent attorney's fees on the $5.7 million interest by following Cotnam and
reasoning that the Michigan Attorney Lien Statute was similar to that of Ala-
bama's.2
2 4
3. Baylin
In Baylin v. United States,225 the Federal Circuit rejected Cotnam and
reasoned that an attorney lien statute does not override assignment of income
cases. 226 In Baylin, a plaintiff partnership sought a higher evaluation for prop-
erty seized by the state of Maryland.227 The court held that no part of the attor-
ney's fee was allocated to and excluded from an interest recovery but all of the
fee was a non-deductible capital expenditure. 228 The Baylin court thereby forced
a capital, rather than an ordinary, treatment of the fees which offset gain on the
state's condemnation award.229
4. Coady
In Coady v. Commissioner,230 the Ninth Circuit rejected Cotnam and Es-
tate of Clarks and adopted Baylin.231 The court reasoned that (1) "attorneys do
not have a superior lien or ownership interest" in Alaska,232 (2) the defendant
paid the full amount to the plaintiff and the plaintiff then paid the attorney's
fees, 233 and (3) the assignment of income doctrine applies. 234 At least one com-
mentator has said that these cases use a "three-pronged analysis" of "attorney
lien statutes, the assignment-of-income doctrine, and Old Colony Trust analy-
sis. 23
5
223 See id. at 855-58.
224 See id. at 856.
225 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
226 See id. at 1454-55.
227 See id. at 1452.
228 See id. at 1455.
229 See id. at 1453-54.
230 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
231 See id. at 1189-91.
232 Id. at 1190.
233 See id.
234 See id. at 1191 (citing Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940)).
235 Geier, supra note 206, at 549.
[Vol. 104
30
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 104, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol104/iss1/7
THE CLINTONS' LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
5. Kenseth
In Kenseth v. Commissioner,236 the Tax Court also held that attorney's
fees were not excludable from an award.237 Kenseth was a member of a class
action lawsuit under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
238
Under the contingent fee contract, 40% was due the attorneys (46% in the case
of an appeal), and Kenseth's award was paid into an attorneys' trust account
with Kenseth receiving oniy the amount net of attorney's fees.239 In a reviewed
opinion, the Tax Court split, with eight judges in the majority opinion and five
dissenting.24° The majority used the assignment of income doctrine and de-
clined to use the attorney lien statute argument in holding inclusion of the full
award, including fees, was required.24' Judge Chabot, in one dissent, rejected
the application of the assignment of income cases because of "hardship" and
was unw illing to await a change in the alternative minimum tax rules by Con-
gress as was the majority.242 Judge Beghe, the presiding judge at trial, also re-
jected the assignment of income cases, but specifically because "Kenseth did not
retain enough control over his claim.,
243
6. The Clintons and Excluding Defendant's Attorney's Fees
As discussed above, the Clintons fall squarely into an AMT problem if
they have income from the trust payments of legal expenses and select to deduct
those expenses as employee business expenses.2 " Could the Clintons argue
Cotnam for themselves as defendants with legal fees, saying that they never had
income from a trust, whose proceeds were used to pay their attorneys' fees, be-
causea then nevar h 0ad ny on ntrfl oer income.,n' 'T'kt. ~ .- l .+ was discussed
above in the context of Revenue Ruling 76-276 and a potential argument by Bill
Clinton that he had no control over trust funds.24 5 Still, the Clintons could argue
they suffer the same inequity that Judge Chabot was concerned about in his
Kenseth dissent.246 That is, if the Clintons have income, they will run into the
236 114 T.C. 399 (2000).
237 See id.
238 See id. at 400.
239 See id. at 401-02.
240 See id. at 417.
241 See id. at 413-14, 413 n.7 and accompanying text.
242 See id. at 417-21 (Chabot, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 425 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
244 See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
246 See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 417-21 (Chabot, J. dissenting).
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AMT problem that Judge Chabot was willing to repair without congressional
intervention. 47 However, such arguments most certainly fly in the face of Old
Colony Trust Co. However, Old Colony Trust Co. may be distinguished as
standing for a third party paying one's expenses, where that third party would
otherwise be paying salary or dividends to an individual. Still, such reasoning
would bring one back to the question of the motives of the third parties, which
was discussed earlier. Do the third parties have the requisite donative intent or
disinterested motive of Duberstein?
Given this reasoning, the hot issue raised in such recent cases as Estate
of Clarks, Kenseth, and Coady seems to require revisiting the venerable cases of
Old Colony Trust Co. and Duberstein, as well as Helvering v. Horst. Unless of
course, one is as prepared as Judge Chabot in Kenseth to reject the application
of established judicial doctrines.248 Judge Chabot specifically rejected the as-
signment of income doctrine. 249 The Clintons, therefore, in all likelihood, would
have to hope for a rejection of Old Colony Trust Co. and Duberstein to avoid an
AMT problem.
V. THE CLINTONS' LEGAL EXPENSES AND TAXPAYER PENALTIES, PREPARER
PENALTIES, AND PREPARER ETHICS
The final issue which arises for the Clintons and which this Article will
address is whether the Clintons and their tax preparer are subject to any penal-
ties or preparer ethics provisions for their current or possible future return filing
positions. 250 The Clintons' tax returns for 1998 and 1999 did not include any
income for contributions to their legal defense trusts nor, apparently, any disclo-
sures relating to the failure to include income.251 Similarly, if the Clintons were
to include income for contributions to the trust and then deduct the legal ex-
penses, a second issue that arises is whether or not they and their preparer would
be subject to any penalties or ethical provisions.
247 See id.
248 See id. at 420-41.
249 See id.
250 For further discussion on taxpayer and tax preparer penalties, see John R. Dorocak, Poten-
tial Penalties and Ethical Problems of a Filing Position: Not Reporting Gain on the Expiration of
a SCIN After - Estate of Frane v. Comm'r, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 217 (1998) [hereinafter Poten-
tial Penalties and Ethical Problems of a Filing Position]; John R. Dorocak, Potential Penalties
and Ethical Problems in Filing an Amended Return: The Case of the Repentant
Sports/Entertainment Figure's Legal Expenses Deduction, 52 ME. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (2000) [herein-
after Potential Penalties and Ethical Problems in Filing an Amended Return].
251 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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A. Taxpayer and Preparer Penalties
I.R.C. § 6662 imposes a 20% penalty on a taxpayer who substantially
understates the tax liability due on a tax return.252 The 20% penalty is applied
only to the amount of the understatement. 53 A taxpayer may avoid the substan-
• tial understatement penalty, however, if there is (1) substantial authority for the
taxpayer's filing position or (2) disclosure by the taxpayer and a reasonable ba-
sis for the taxpayer's filing position.2 54  "Substantial authority" is a less strin-
gent standard than "the more likely than not" standard 255 but more stringent than
the reasonable basis standard.256 The Treasury Regulations provide that "[t]here
is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item only if the weight of the
authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of
authorities supporting contrary treatment., 257 For purposes of determining sub-
stantial authority only certain authority may be relied upon.258 Such qualified
authority includes the I.R.C., statutes, regulations, revenue rulings, revenue
259procedures, and court cases.
252 See I.R.C. § 6662 (1994). A substantial understatement of income tax for a taxable year is
an understatement that is greater than 10% of the income tax required to be reported on the tax-
payer's tax return or $5000. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (1994). For corporations, however, an
substantial understatement is an amount that exceeds the greater of 10% of the income tax re-
quired to be reported on the tax return or $10,000. See I.R.C. § 6661(d)(1)(B) (1994).
253 See I.R.C. § 6662(a) (1994).
2M See I.R.C. § 6662(d) (1994). I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (1994) states:
(B) Reduction for understatement due to position of taxpayer or dis-
closed item.
The amount of the understatement under subparagraph (A) shall be re-
duced by that portion of the understatement which is attributable to-
(i) the tax treatment of any item by the taxpayer if there is or was substantial
authority for such treatment, or
(ii) any item if-
(I) the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are adequately dis-
closed in the return or in a statement attached to the return, and
(II) there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of such item by the
taxpayer.
Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-7 (2000) states: "For purposes of sections 1.6662-3 and 1.6662-
4(e) and (f) (relating to methods of making adequate disclosure), the provisions of 1.6662-
3(b)(3) apply in determining whether a return position has a reasonable basis."
255 The "more likely than not" standard is met when there is a greater than 50% likelihood of
the position being upheld. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2)(2000).
256 Defined as reasonable reliance on one or more of the authorities permitted to be used to
establish substantial authority. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(b)(3), 1.6662-7(d) (2000).
257 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3) (2000).
258 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662 -4(d)(3)(iii) (2000).
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cedures, and court cases.259
If the taxpayer cannot meet the substantial authority standard, then the
penalty may still be avoided if there is a reasonable basis and disclosure. 260
However, "reasonable basis" is considered to be a "'significantly higher' stan-
dard than 'not frivolous. ' ,26 1 Recently, reasonable basis has been defined as an
even higher standard than before. In new Regulations §§ 1.6662-7(d) and
1.6662-3(b)(3), reasonable basis is defined as reasonable reliance on one or
more of the authorities permitted to be used to establish substantial authority. 262
I.R.C. § 6662 also imposes a 20% penalty on a taxpayer for underpay-
ment of taxes if the underpayment is due to the taxpayer's disregard of rules or
regulations.263 For a taxpayer to avoid this 20% penalty for disregard of rules
and regulations, similar disclosure and reasonable basis for a filing position are
both required.26
A taxpayer may avoid all of the 20% penalties imposed under § 6662,
including the negligence penalty, by showing reasonable cause and good
259 Id.
260 See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (1994).
261 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2000) ("Reasonable basis is a relatively high standard of
tax reporting, that is, significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper."). See
also Dorocak, supra note 250; Potential Penalties and Ethical Problems of a Filing Position;
Dorocak, Potential Penalties and Ethical Problems in Filing an Amended Return, supra note
250.
262 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-7(d), 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2000). See also Lawrence M. Hill &
Steven A. Sirotic, Prop. Regs. Heighten the "Reasonable Basis" Standard for Return Positions,
28 TAx ADVISER 6, 496 (1997). Regulation § 1.6662-7 refers to Regulation § 1.6662-3(b)(3)
"in determining whether a return position has a reasonable basis." Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-7
(2000). Regulation § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2000) states:
Reasonable basis is a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is,
significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper. The
reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is
merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim. If a return position
is reasonably based on one or more of the authorities set forth in §
1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (taking into account the relevance and persuasive-
ness of the authorities, and subsequent developments), the return posi-
tion will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard even though it
may not satisfy the substantial authority standard as defined in §
1.6662-4(d)(2).
Additionally, see Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (2000) for rules with respect to
relevance, persuasiveness, subsequent developments, and use of a well-reasoned construction of
an applicable statutory provision for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty. In
addition, the reasonable cause and good faith exception in § 1.6664-4 may provide relief from
the penalty for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, even if a return position does not
satisfy the reasonable basis standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2000).
263 See I.R.C. § 6662 (1994).
264 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2000).
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faith. 265 "The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause
and in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all perti-
nent facts and circumstances. ' '266 According to the Regulations, the most impor-
tant factor generally is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess his or her
267proper tax liability.
Tax return preparers are also subject to penalties for an understatement
of a taxpayer's liability.268 I.R.C. § 6694(a) imposes a $250 penalty on a pre-
parer who understates a taxpayer's tax liability based on an unrealistic posi-
tion.269 I.R.C. § 6694(b) also imposes a $1000 penalty on a preparer who under-
states a taxpayer's tax liability willfully or in reckless or intentional disregard of
rules and regulations. 270  "Rules and Regulations," according to the Service,
include treasury regulations, revenue rulings, and IRS notices.
For a preparer to avoid the $250 unrealistic position penalty, either (1) a
realistic possibility of prevailing on the merits (a realistic possibility of success
or RPOS), or (2) a non-frivolous position and disclosure is required. 272 RPOS is
273 u
a one-third or greater likelihood of being sustained on the merits. A frivolous
265 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-1, 1.6664-4 (2000).
266 Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-1(b) (2000).
267 "Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good faith include an honest misun-
derstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including
the experience, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-1(b) (2000).
268 See I.R.C. § 6694 (1994).
269 See I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1994).
270 See I.R.C. § 6694(b) (1994).
271 Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(f) (2000).
272 See I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2001). I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2001) reads:
Understatements due to unrealistic positions. If:
(1) any part of any understatement of liability with respect to any re-
turn or claim for refund is due to a position for which there was not a re-
alistic possibility of being sustained on its merits.
(2) any person who is an income tax return preparer with respect to
such return or claim knew (or reasonably should have known) of such po-
sition, and
(3) such position was not disclosed as provided in section
6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) or was frivolous, such person shall pay a penalty of
$250 with respect to such return or claim unless it is shown that there is
reasonable cause for the understatement and such person acted in good
faith.
273 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (1994). Regulation §1.6694-2(b)(1) (1994) reads:
Realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits:
(1) In general. A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of
being sustained on its merits if a reasonable and well-informed analysis by
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position, on the other hand, is one which is patently improper.274
The standard for practitioners to avoid the $1000 § 6694(b) penalty, for
willful understatement or reckless disregard of rules or regulations, does not
seem to be very different from the § 6694(a) standard of RPOS or a non-
frivolous position and disclosure. The Service has stated that a preparer who
takes a position contrary to a revenue ruling or notice is considered to have
acted recklessly or intentionally if the position does not have RPOS, 75 unless
the position is non-frivolous with adequate disclosure and good faith.276 How-
ever, disclosure differs for reckless conduct and an unrealistic position: without
a Form 8275 or 8275R, disclosure on the return does not prevent the reckless
conduct penalty for a non-frivolous position even where there is good faith.277
Concerning RPOS, the regulations indicate that several court cases holding that
a revenue ruling is incorrect meets the reasonable possibility standard, but
merely one Tax Court case invalidating a regulation does not.278
As with the taxpayer penalties, the tax return preparer penalties of §
6694 may not be imposed if the preparer's understatement is due to reasonable
cause and the preparer acted in good faith considering all the circumstances in-
volved. 279 However, this reasonable cause and good faith exception "does not
apply to an error that would have been apparent from a general review" of the
280return by the taxpayer.
B. Application of Penalty Rules to the Clintons and Their Tax Return
Preparer
The Clintons' 1998 and 1999 tax returns, as filed, excluded the contri-
a person knowledgeable in the tax law would lead such a person to con-
clude that the position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likeli-
hood of being sustained on its merits (realistic possibility standard). In
making this determination, the possibility that the position will not be
challenged by the Internal Revenue Service (e.g., because the taxpayer's
return may not be audited or because the issue may not be raised on audit)
is not to be taken into account. The analysis prescribed by § 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(ii) for purposes of determining whether substantial authority is
present applies for purposes of determining whether the realistic possibil-
ity standard is satisfied.
274 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(2) (2000).
275 A one-third or greater likelihood of being sustained on the merits. See Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-2(c)(3) (2000).
276 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(c)(2) (2000).
277 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(2) (2000); Rev. Proc. 97-56, 1997-2 C.B. 582.
278 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(d) example 3, 4 (2000).
279 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d) (2000).
280 Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d)(1) (2000).
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butions to their legal defense trust.28 1 Those tax returns also apparently do not
make a disclosure concerning the exclusion.282 Therefore, for the Clintons to
avoid the § 6662(d) penalty for substantial understatement, they will need sub-
stantial authority. The IRS has defined substantial authority as including,
among other things, court cases and "notices, announcements and other adminis-
trative pronouncements published by the Service in the Internal Revenue Bulle-
tin.' 283 The most directly applicable court case regarding the Clintons' likely
argument that the contributions to their trust were gifts, Carson v. Commis-
sioner, ruled against the IRS when it made the argument that similar transfers to
individual politicians were gifts.284 The Clintons, however, could try to find
substantial authority in two IRS pronouncements published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin, the Service's non-acquiescence in Carson and Revenue Rul-
ing 72-355.285
However, the Clintons may have difficulty in finding "substantial" au-
thority given that the authorities go both ways, as those authorities are defined
by the IRS itself. In the hierarchy of standards, the next lowest for the Clintons
to meet to avoid a 20% substantial understatement penalty would be reasonable
281 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
282 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
283 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (2000). Regulation § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (2000)
provides:
Types of authority. Except in cases described in paragraph (d)(3)(iv) of
this section concerning written determinations, only the following are
authority for purposes of determining whether there is substantial au-
thority for the tax treatment of an item: Applicable provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code and other statutory provisions; proposed, tem-
porary and final regulations construing such statutes; revenue rulings
and revenue procedures; tax treaties and regulations thereunder, and
Treasury Department and other official explanations of such treaties;
court cases; congressional intent as reflected in committee reports,
joint explanatory statements of managers included in conference com-
mittee reports, and floor statements made prior to enactment by one of
a bill's managers: General Explanations of tax legislation prepared by
the Joint Committee on Taxation (the Blue Book); private letter rulings
and technical advice memoranda issued after October 31, 1976; actions
on decisions and general counsel memoranda issued after March 12,
1981 (as well as general counsel memoranda published in pre-1955
volumes of the Cumulative Bulletin); Internal Revenue Service infor-
mation or press releases and notices, announcements and other admin-
istrative pronouncements published by the Service in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin.
284 See generally Carson v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 252 (1978), aff'd, 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir.
1981), nonacq. 1979-2 C.B. 2. See also supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
285 See generally Carson, 71 T.C. 252 (1978), aff'd, 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), nonacq.
1979-2 C.B. 2. See generally also Rev. Rul. 72-355, 1972-2 C.B. 532; Rev. Rul 72-355, 1972-
2 C.B. 532. See also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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basis with disclosure under § 6662(d).286 Reasonable basis is, again, a "signifi-
cantly higher" standard than not frivolous.287
The Treasury Regulations accompanying the preparer penalty provision
of §§ 6694(a) and (b) provide two examples which may help illustrate whether
the Clintons can meet the reasonable basis standard. 288 To avoid the preparer
penalty, the preparer must have a realistic possibility of success (RPOS) 289 or a
non-frivolous position and disclosure.290 Example 4 of Regulation § 1.6694-
3(d) presents a situation in which the basis for the tax position is a Tax Court
decision that invalidates a final regulation requiring capitalization of certain
291expenses. The Service's conclusion is that the preparer will be subject to the
§ 6694(b) penalty (reckless and intentional disregard of rules and regulations),
even though there may be a realistic possibility of success, unless there is ade-
quate disclosure.292 Example 3 of the same regulation poses a situation in which
the basis for the tax position is a Revenue Ruling, which holds that expenses
must be capitalized, despite several court cases from different courts holding
these expenses may be deducted.293 In this example, the Service finds a reason-
able possibility of being sustained on the merits and a preparer, therefore, may
report the position without disclosure.294
The Clintons' situation may be somewhere between examples 3 and 4
of Regulation § 1.6694-3(d) because one court case is clearly contrary to an IRS
Revenue Ruling and non-acquiescence. Thus, the opposite position, at least
presumably, would have RPOS or close to it. This may be just the sort of in-
side-out logic the Clintons are relying on to argue that the Service's position is
also at least RPOS, i.e., a one in three chance of winning, and possibly even a
reasonable basis.
The Clintons may also be relying on the plaintiffs' attorney's fees cases
where some plaintiffs have been successful in arguing that attorney's fees
should in effect be excluded from income or, in other words, only their award
286 See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text. One is hard pressed to resist suggesting
that the Clintons have had difficulties in meeting even lowered standards.
287 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (2000).
288 See Treas. Reg. § 1.694-3(d) example 3, 4 (2000). See also Dorocak, Potential Penalties
and Ethical Problems of a Filing Position, supra note 26150.
289 Defined as a one-third or greater likelihood of being sustained on the merits. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (2000).
290 A frivolous position is one which is patently improper. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(2)
(2000).
291 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(d) example 4 (2000).
292 See id.
293 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(d) example 3 (2000).
294 See id. Interestingly, Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-3(a) (2000) appears to also relieve the
taxpayer of the penalty for disregarding rules and regulations for merely RPOS.
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295net of attorney's fees should be included in income. To the extent that some
of these cases might bolster the Clintons' position, they still do not seem to be
enough on their own to constitute substantial authority because there are con-
trary authorities. The IRS anti-Carson position, plus some of the attorney's fees
cases, might be enough to give the Clintons reasonable basis for their position of
excluding the contributions to their legal defense trust. However, to avoid the
substantial understatement penalty under § 6662(d), these taxpayers would need
disclosure of their filing position in addition to reasonable basis.296 As previ-
ously mentioned, the Clintons' tax return apparently did not disclose the exclu-
sion of the contributions to the legal defense trust.
297
For the Clintons' preparer to avoid the $250 penalty of I.R.C. § 6694(a)
or the $1000 penalty for willful, reckless, or intentional disregard of rules of
regulations of § 6694(b), the preparer would need RPOS.298 If the Clintons are
close to achieving reasonable basis as immediately discussed above, then their
preparer may have RPOS, the at least slightly lower standard of a one-in-three
chance of winning. Without RPOS, the preparer would need a non-frivolous
position and disclosure, 299 but again the Clintons have not disclosed the receipt
of contributions by the legal defense trust on their 1040's for 1998 and 1999. At
least the preparer might be able to avoid a penalty. 300 The higher $1000 penalty
of § 6694(b) appears to be the penalty which the preparer most likely will avoid
because the IRS has defined "rules and regulations" to include its own revenue
rulings. 3
0 1
C. Application of Ethical Rules to the Clintons' Tax Return Preparer302
The -. ..... ethical standards seem generally to mimic the § 6694 pen-
alty rules.30 3 The standard for litigating a case in Tax Court is a non-frivolous
295 See supra notes 209-49 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 27268-71 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
300 See Dorocak, Potential Penalties and Ethical Problems in Filing an Amended Return,
supra note 26150, at n.103 (citing Stephen Labaton, G.O.P. 's Whitewater Report is Expected to
Raise Questions Over Clinton Tax Filings, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1996, at A13; Carl J. Panek,
Clintons Pay Income Tax Penalty Over Whitewater Deductions, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1996, at
C 12). The Clintons could possibly blame their tax return preparer for errors in their tax returns.
301 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(f) (2000).
302 The Clintons' tax return preparer is a CPA at Hariton, Mancuso & Jones in Rockville,
Maryland. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 472; Greater Wash. Society of CPAs, Wash. D.C.,
GWSCPA Scholarship Fund, at http://www.gwscpa.org/2Pscholarship.htm (Aug. 19, 2001).
303 For a general discussion of the ethical standards for preparers see Dorocak, Potential
Penalties and Ethical Problems of a Filing Position, supra note 26150, at 246 n.187 and ac-
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position.3° Similarly, a preparer can avoid a penalty under § 6694(a) with a
non-frivolous position and disclosure. 30 5 Otherwise, the preparer needs RPOS.
The preparer clearly faces conflicting standards because, as discussed, to avoid a
penalty, the taxpayer needs to meet the higher standards of either reasonable
basis and disclosure or substantial authority.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the
American Bar Association (ABA), and the IRS have set forth ethical guidelines
that are generally in accord with the Tax Court and I.R.C. penalty provisions.
For example, neither the old AICPA Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Prac-
tice, nor the new AICPA Statements on Standards for Tax Services express the
realistic possibility standard in terms of percentage odds. 306 However, the real-
307istic possibility standard is accepted in a 1985 ABA Formal Opinion. Be-
cause the ABA Formal Opinion was issued before I.R.C. § 6694 was enacted,
companying text.
304 I.R.C. § 6673 (2001). Section 6673 states as follows:
(a) Tax Court proceedings
(1) Procedures instituted primarily for delay, etc.
Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that-
(A) proceedings before it have been instituted or maintained by the tax-
payer primarily for delay,
(B) the taxpayer's position in such proceeding is frivolous or ground-
less, or
(C) the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue available administrative
remedies,
the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the taxpayer to pay to the
United States a penalty not in excess of $25,000.
For a discussion of penalties as a toll charge rather than a standard of conduct, see generally
Panel Discussion, American Bar Association Mid-Year Meeting, Section of Taxation, Stan-
dards of Tax Practice Committee, New Orleans, Louisiana (Jan. 1996) (Available from ADC
Services, 69013 River Bend Drive, Covington, LA 70433, (504) 892-1157).
305 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-(c)(2) (2000).
306 See AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENTS ON RESPONSIBILITIES IN
TAX PRACTICE INTERPRETATION No. 1-1 (1991), available in FLOYD W. WINDALL, ETHICS AND
THE ACCOUNTANT 219 (Prentice Hall 1991); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
STATEMENTS ON RESPONSIBILITIES IN TAX PRACTICE No. 1 (1988), available at
http://www.aicpa.org (last updated Oct. 23, 2001); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
STATEMENTS ON STANDARDS FOR TAx SERVICES (2000), available at
http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/tax/exsumsts2.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2001); Id. at 12-14,
available at http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/tax/exsumsts2.htm. The new Statements on
Standards became effective, and therefore enforceable rather than merely advisory as the old
Statements on Responsibilities were, on October 31, 2000. See also J. Edward Swails, New
Standards for Tax Practice, J. ACCT., Nov. 2000, at 79.
307 See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
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the opinion fails to mention disclosure for a non-frivolous position.308 Instead,
the opinion prescribes withdrawal when the lawyer does not have a good faith
belief that there is a reasonable probability of success. 309 Treasury Department
Circular 230, which governs practice before the IRS, states that the standards are
now in accord with I.R.C. § 6694, as they require either a reasonable possibility
of success 310 or a non-frivolous position and adequate disclosure.31'
Ethical matters may not be so easily quantifiable. The AICPA once re-
quired Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to follow clear and unambiguous
authorities.31 More recently, in both the old and new Statements, the AICPA
grants CPAs latitude to choose well-reasoned constructions of statutory authori-
ties where rules are ambiguous. 313 Yet, the IRS does not appear to grant such
latitude to tax return preparers. According to Treasury Regulation § 1.6694-
2(b)(3), even judicial construction of an identical statute in another jurisdiction
is not substantial authority even though, as with conclusions in treatises and
periodicals, the authorities underlying the court's opinion may support a realistic
possibility.1 4
As for the Clintons' return preparer and meeting these ethical guide-
lines, it would appear that the closer the Clintons' filing position comes to
RPOS because of the IRS's position on contributions to an individual politician
as constituting gifts and some court cases excluding plaintiff's attorney's fees
from judicial awards, the closer the preparer will be to avoiding not only a pen-
alty but also any ethical sanction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ihe Clintons likely have income from payment of expenses by third
parties according to Old Colony Trust Co. and a failure to meet the definition of
a gift as outlined in Commissioner v. Duberstein.1 5 Still, the Clintons will
likely be able to deduct their legal expenses as employee business expenses un-
der cases such as Gilmore, Jenkins, and Salt, and more specifically cases dealing
with politicians such as McDonald, Lussy, Messina, McDonald and Soloman.316
308 See id.
309 See id.
310 Defined as a one-in-three chance of prevailing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (2000).
311 See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (2000).
312 See Statements on Standards for Tax Services No. 1, Interpretation No. 1-1, and General
Interpretation 5, which state somewhat curiously, "The realistic possibility standard is stricter
than the reasonable basis standard that is in the IRC."
313 See id.
314 See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3) example 7 (2000).
315 See supra notes 4-1 18 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 119-203 and accompanying text.
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If deducted, the Clintons will likely face an alternative minimum tax because
their attorney's fees are not deductible for AMT.3 17 However, the Clintons may
try to rely on recent cases allowing a prevailing plaintiff to report net awards
and thereby exclude their attorney's fees. 318 The Clintons, of course, would try
to exclude their attorney's fees, despite the fact that they were defendants in the
cases.
319
Furthermore, the Clintons may well be subject to a 20% substantial un-
derstatement penalty because their position may not have a substantial authority
nor a reasonable basis plus disclosure. 320 Even if the Clintons have reasonable
basis, their failure to disclose the filing position of not reporting the contribu-
tions to the trust would require the penalty to be applied. Finally, the Clintons'
tax return preparer may be able to avoid penalty provisions and ethical viola-
tions because the preparer is only required to have a reasonable possibility of
success even without disclosure.
321
All of these conclusions are, in a sense, predicated on an IRS audit of
the Clintons. However, such an audit might never arise because of the IRS's
still published position in the nonacquiesance rejecting Carson v. Commis-
sioner. 32  Lack.of an audit might be considered a failure to hold the Clintons
accountable. At $7.4 million of legal fees paid by the Trust, 323 and at roughly a
28% AMT rate and a 20% substantial understatement penalty rate, the Clintons
could owe nearly $2.1 million in tax and $420,000 in penalties.
317 See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
318 See supra notes 207-43 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
320 See supra notes 250-67, 281-97 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 268-81 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
323 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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